Formal models of bureaucracy

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 15, Issue , 2012, Pages 353-377

  Gailmard, Sean ^a   Patty, John W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

delegation; expertise; information asymmetries; principal agent theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861424461     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103314     Document Type: Review

References (65)

1. Alesina A, Tabellini G. 2007. Bureaucrats or politicians? Part I: A single policy task. Am. Econ. Rev. 97(1):169-79
2. Alesina A, Tabellini G. 2008. Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks. J. Public Econ. 92(3-4):426-47
3. Alonso R, Matouschek N. 2008. Optimal delegation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 75:259-93
4. Bendor J. 1988. Formal models of bureaucracy. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 18(3):353-95
5. Bendor J, Glazer A, Hammond T. 2001. Theories of delegation. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 4(1):235-69
6. Bendor J, Meirowitz A. 2004. Spatial models of delegation. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 98(2):293-310
7. Bertelli A, Feldmann S. 2007. Strategic appointments. J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 17:19-38
8. Boehmke F, Gailmard S, Patty J. 2006. Whose ear to bend? Information sources and venue choice in policy making. Q. J. Polit. Sci. 1(2):139-69
9. Bueno deMesquita E, Stephenson M. 2007. Regulatory quality under imperfect oversight.Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 101(03):605-20
10. Callander S. 2008. A theory of policy expertise. Q. J. Polit. Sci. 3(2):123-40
11. Carpenter D, Ting MM. 2007. Regulatory errors with endogenous agendas. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 51(4):835-52
12. Carpenter DP. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
13. Crawford VP, Sobel J. 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50(6):1431-51
14. Crombez C, Groseclose T, Krehbiel K. 2006. Gatekeeping. J. Polit. 68(2):322-34
15. Dessein W. 2002. Authority and communication in organizations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 69(4):811-38
16. Epstein D, O'Halloran S. 1994. Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion: slack versus flexibility. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 38(3):697-722
17. Epstein D, O'Halloran S. 1996. Divided government and the design of administrative procedures: a formal model and empirical test. J. Polit. 58(2):393-417
18. Epstein D, O'Halloran S. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
19. FiorinaM. 1982. The consequences of cross-cutting networks for political participation. Public Choice 39:33-66
20. Gailmard S. 2002. Expertise, subversion, and bureaucratic discretion. J. Law Econ. Organ. 18(2):536-55
21. Gailmard S. 2009a.Discretion rather than rules: choice of instruments to constrain bureaucratic policy-making. Polit. Anal. 17(1):25-44
22. Gailmard S. 2009b. Oversight and agency problems in legislative- bureaucratic interaction. J. Theor. Polit. 121(2):161-86
23. Gailmard S, Patty JW. 2007. Slackers and zealots: civil service, policy discretion, and bureaucratic expertise. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 51(4):873-89
24. Gailmard S, Patty JW. 2011. Stovepiping.Work. Pap., Dep. Polit. Sci.,Washington Univ. St. Louis
25. Gailmard S, Patty JW. 2012. Learning While Governing: Information, Accountability, and Executive Branch Institutions. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. In press
26. Gill J. 1995. Formal models of legislative/administrative interaction: a survey of the subfield. Public Adm. Rev. 55(1):99-106
27. Gilligan T, Krehbiel K. 1987. Collective decision-making and standing committees: an informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures. J. Law Econ. Organ. 3:287-335
28. Gordon SC, Hafer C. 2005. Flexing muscle: corporate political expenditures as signals to the bureaucracy. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 99:245-61
29. Hammond TH, Knott JH. 1996. Who controls the bureaucracy? Presidential power, congressional dominance, legal constraints, and bureaucratic autonomy in a model of multi-institutional policy-making. J. Law Econ. Organ. 12(1):119-66
30. Hirsch AV, Shotts KW. 2012. Policy specific information and informal agenda power. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 56(1):67-83
31. Holmström B. 1984. On the theory of delegation. In Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, ed. M Boyer, R Khilstrom, pp. 37-52. New York: North Holland
32. Howell WG. 2003. Power Without Persuasion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
33. Huber J, McCarty N. 2004. Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 98(3):481-94
34. Huber JD, Shipan CR. 2002. Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
35. Keefer P, Stasavage D. 2003. The limits of delegation: veto players, central bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 97(3):407-23
36. Knott JH, Miller GJ. 1987. Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
37. Lewis DE. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
38. Lowi TJ. 1979. The End of Liberalism. New York: Norton. 2nd ed.
39. Maskin E, Tirole J. 2004. The politician and the judge: accountability in government. Am. Econ. Rev. 94(4):1034-54
40. McCarty N. 2004. The appointments dilemma. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48:413-28
41. McCubbins M, Noll R, Weingast B. 1987. Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. J. Law Econ. Organ. 3(2):243-77
42. McCubbins M, Noll R, Weingast B. 1989. Structure and process, politics and policy: administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. Va. Law Rev. 75(2):431-89
43. McCubbins M, Schwartz T. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols versus fire alarms. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 28:165-79
44. Milgrom P, Roberts J. 1986. Relying on the information of interested parties. RAND J. Econ. 17:18-32
45. Moe T, HowellW. 1999. The presidential power of unilateral action. J. Law Econ. Organ. 15(1):132-79
46. Niskanen W. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine
47. Patty JW. 2009. The politics of biased information. J. Polit. 71(2):385-97
48. Prendergast C. 2003. The limits of bureaucratic efficiency. J. Polit. Econ. 111:929-58
49. Prendergast C. 2007. The motivation and bias of bureaucrats. Am. Econ. Rev. 97:180-96
50. Shotts K, Wiseman A. 2010. The politics of investigations and regulatory enforcement by independent agents and cabinet appointees. J. Polit. 72:209-26
51. Skowronek S. 1993. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
52. Spence M. 1973. Job market signaling. Q. J. Econ. 87:355-74
53. Stasavage D. 2003. Transparency, democratic accountability, and the economic consequences of monetary institutions. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47(3):389-402
54. Stasavage D. 2007. Polarization and publicity: rethinking the benefits of deliberative democracy. J. Polit. 69(1):59-72
55. Stephenson MC. 2004. Court of public opinion: government accountability and judicial independence. J. Law Econ. Organ. 20(2):379-99
56. Stephenson MC. 2006a. A costly signaling theory of "hard look" judicial review. Adm. Law Rev. 58(4):753-814
57. Stephenson MC. 2006b. Legislative allocation of delegated power: uncertainty, risk, and the choice between agencies and courts. Harvard Law Econ. Disc. Pap. No. 506
58. Stephenson MC. 2007. Bureaucratic decision costs and endogenous agency expertise. J. Law Econ. Organ. 23(2):469-98
59. Stephenson MC. 2008. Optimal political control of the bureaucracy. Mich. Law Rev. 107:53-55
60. Ting MM. 2002. A theory of jurisdictional assignments in bureaucracies. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 46(2):364-78
61. Ting MM. 2003. A strategic theory of bureaucratic redundancy. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47(2):274-92
62. Ting MM. 2008. Whistleblowing. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 102:249-67
63. Ting MM. 2009. Organizational capacity. J. Law Econ. Organ. 27(2):245-71
64. Volden C. 2002. A formal model of the politics of delegation in a separation of powers system. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 46(1):111-33
65. Wiseman AE. 2009. Delegation and positive-sum bureaucracies. J. Polit. 71(03):998-1014