A theory of jurisdictional assignments in bureaucracies

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 364-378

  Ting, Michael M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036004235     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3088382     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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4. Politicians, bureaucrats, and asymmetric information
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7. Understanding the challenger disaster: Organizational structure and the design of reliable systems
8. Multi-task principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design
9. Redundancy, rationality, and the problem of duplication and overlap
10. Administrative procedures as instruments of political control
11. Bureaucrats, legislators, and the size of government
12. The politics of bureaucratic structure
13. Food and drug administration