Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 426-447

  Alesina, Alberto ^a,b,c   Tabellini, Guido ^c,d,e  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^e CESifo ^*  (Canada)

Author keywords

Bureaucracies; Delegation; Politics

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149093403     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.06.004     Document Type: Article

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