The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

American Political Science Review

Volumn 97, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 407-423

  Keeper, Philip ^a   Stasavage, David ^b  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141574246     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055403000777     Document Type: Article

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