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Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 19-38

Strategic appointments

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EID: 33845767806     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muj017     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (69)

References (64)
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