Bureaucrats or politicians? Part I: A single policy task

American Economic Review

Volumn 97, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 169-179

  Alesina, Alberto ^a,b   Tabellini, Guido ^c,d  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^d CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35448934929     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.169     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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