Flexing muscle: Corporate political expenditures as signals to the bureaucracy

American Political Science Review

Volumn 99, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 245-261

  Gordon, Sanford C ^a   Hafer, Catherine ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744453490     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055405051634     Document Type: Article

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