Transparency, democratic accountability, and the economic consequences of monetary institutions

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 389-402

  Stasavage, David ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043267646     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00028     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Andersen, Palle, and William Wascher. 1999. "Sacrifice Ratios and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in Conditions of Low Inflation." Bank of International Settlements Working Paper No. 82.
2. Ball, Lawrence. 1994. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?" In Monetary Policy, ed. Gregory Mankiw. University of Chicago Press, 155-82.
3. Barro, Robert, and David Gordon. 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model." Journal of Political Economy 91(4):589-610.
4. Bernhard, William, Lawrence Broz, and William Clark. 2002. "The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions: an Introduction." International Organization.
5. Broz, Lawrence. 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." International Organization.
6. Calmfors, Lars. 2000. "Wages and Wage Bargaining Institutions in the EMU." Empirica 28(4):325-51.
7. Canzoneri, Matthew. 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information." American Economic Review 75(5):1056-70.
8. Chortareas, Georgios, David Stasavage, and Gabriel Sterne. 2002. "Does it Pay to Have a Transparent Central Bank? International Evidence." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 84(5):99-118.
9. Cukierman, Alex. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence. Cambridge: MIT Press.
10. Cukierman, Alex, and Allan Meltzer. (1986) "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information." Econometrica 54(5):1099-128.
11. Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. 2001. Learning and Expectations in Microeconomics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. Faust, Jon, and Lars Svensson. 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals." International Economic Review 42(2):369-97.
13. Franzese, Robert. 2001a. "The Positive Political Economy of Public Debt." Unpublished manuscript. University of Michigan.
14. Franzese, Robert. 2001b. "Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area," Empirica 28(4):457-86.
15. Fry, Maxwell, Deanne Julius, Lavan Mahadeva, Sandra Roger, and Gabriel Sterne. 2000. "Key Issues in the Choice of a Monetary Policy Framework." In Monetary Frameworks in a Global Context, ed. Lavan Mahadeva and Gabriel Sterne. London: Routledge, pp. 1-18.
16. Fudenberg, Drew, and David Levine. 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies are Imperfectly Observed." Review of Economic Studies 59(3):561-79.
17. Geraats, Petra. 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts." European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 41.
18. Goodfriend, Marvin. 1986. "Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking." Journal of Monetary Economics 17(1):63-92.
19. Hutchinson, Michael, and Carl Walsh. 1998. "The Output Inflation Trade-Off and Central Bank Reform: Evidence from New Zealand." Economic Journal 108(May):703-25.
20. Keech, William. 1995. Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press.
21. McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3(2):243-77.
22. Nickell, Stephen, Luca Nunziata, Wolfgang Ochel, and Glenda Quintini. 2001. "The Beveridge Curve." Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, mimeo.
23. Stiglitz, Joseph. 1998. "The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions." Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(2):3-22.
24. Weber, Max. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Oxford: Oxford University Press.