Punishment and cooperation in nature

Trends in Ecology and Evolution

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 288-295

  Raihani, Nichola J ^a,b   Thornton, Alex ^c   Bshary, Redouan ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b INSTITUTE OF ZOOLOGY   (United Kingdom)

^c UK   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY OF NEUCHÂTEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGGRESSION; CHEATING BEHAVIOR; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; LABORATORY METHOD;

AGGRESSION; ANIMAL; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GENETIC SELECTION; HUMAN; PUNISHMENT; REVIEW;

AGGRESSION; ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; PUNISHMENT; SELECTION, GENETIC;

ANIMALIA;

EID: 84860015300     PISSN: 01695347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004     Document Type: Review

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