The evolution of punishment in n-player public goods games: A volunteer's dilemma

Evolution

Volumn 65, Issue 10, 2011, Pages 2725-2728

  Raihani, Nichola J ^a   Bshary, Redouan ^b  

^a INSTITUTE OF ZOOLOGY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEUCHÂTEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; NOTE; PUNISHMENT; THEORETICAL MODEL;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PUNISHMENT;

EID: 84860389658     PISSN: 00143820     EISSN: 15585646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01383.x     Document Type: Note

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