Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

Trends in Ecology and Evolution

Volumn 22, Issue 11, 2007, Pages 593-600

  Sigmund, Karl ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; NEUROLOGY; RECIPROCITY;

COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; MOTIVATION; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; PUNISHMENT; REVIEW;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; MOTIVATION; PUNISHMENT;

ANIMALIA;

EID: 36249011415     PISSN: 01695347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tree.2007.06.012     Document Type: Review

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