Winners don't punish

Nature

Volumn 452, Issue 7185, 2008, Pages 348-351

  Dreber, Anna ^a,d   Rand, David G ^a,b   Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; PLAY;

ADULT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; CORRELATION ANALYSIS; COST; FEMALE; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; MALE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT;

EID: 41149155369     PISSN: 00280836     EISSN: 14764687     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nature06723     Document Type: Article

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