Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis

Psychological Bulletin

Volumn 137, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 594-615

  Balliet, Daniel ^a,b   Mulder, Laetitia B ^c   Van Lange, Paul A M ^b  

^a SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Meta analysis; Punishment; Reward; Social dilemma

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; COST; HUMAN; META ANALYSIS; MOTIVATION; PHYSIOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; PUBLISHING; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; COSTS AND COST ANALYSIS; HUMANS; MOTIVATION; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; PUBLICATION BIAS; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 79959980425     PISSN: 00332909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0023489     Document Type: Article

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