Second- or third-party punishment? When self-interest hides behind apparent functional interventions

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 108, Issue 39, 2011, Pages

  Baumard, Nicolas ^a   Liénard, Pierre ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; GIFT GIVING; HUMAN; KENYA; LETTER; OFFENDER; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; SELF CONCEPT; WAR;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; MALE; PUNISHMENT; WAR;

EID: 80053653097     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1112212108     Document Type: Letter

References (5)

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3. Lamphear J (1994) The evolution of Ateker 'new model' armies: Jie and Turkana. Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, eds Fukui K, Markakis J (James Currey, London).
4. Gray S, et al. (2003) Cattle raiding, cultural survival, and adaptability of East African pastoralists. Curr Anthropol 44:3-30.
5. Bollig M (1990) Ethnic conflicts in North-West Kenya. Z Ethnol 115:73-90.