Interactions between sabre-tooth blennies and their reef fish victims: Effects of enforced repeated game structure and local abundance on victim aggression

Ethology

Volumn 116, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 681-690

  Bshary, Andrea ^a   Bshary, Redouan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEUCHÂTEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABUNDANCE; AGGRESSION; BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE; BODY SIZE; CONSPECIFIC; FISH; HOST-PARASITE INTERACTION; MORPHOLOGY; MUCUS; PUBLIC GOODS; REEF;

ANIMALIA; BLENNIOIDEI; PLAGIOTREMUS;

EID: 77955163416     PISSN: 01791613     EISSN: 14390310     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1439-0310.2010.01781.x     Document Type: Article

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