On the interaction of the stick and the carrot in social dilemmas

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 299, Issue , 2012, Pages 139-143

  Milinski, Manfred ^a   Rockenbach, Bettina ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Public goods game; Punishment; Reputation; Reward

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ARTICLE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; COOPERATION; GAME; LITERATURE; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL DILEMMA; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL PROBLEM;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PUNISHMENT; REWARD;

DAUCUS CAROTA;

EID: 84857921672     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.014     Document Type: Article

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