Defending against a stockpiling terrorist

Engineering Economist

Volumn 56, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 321-353

  Hausken, Kjell ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

^b State University of New York   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASSET VALUATION; DISCOUNT FACTORS; EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS; TERRORIST ATTACKS;

COMMERCE; RESOURCE VALUATION;

TERRORISM;

EID: 84857283459     PISSN: 0013791X     EISSN: 15472701     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0013791X.2011.624260     Document Type: Article

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