Defending against a terrorist who accumulates resources

Military Operations Research

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 21-39

  Hausken, Kjell ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052018326     PISSN: 02755823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5711/1082598316121     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Azaiez, N., Bier, V.M., 2007. Optimal Resource Allocation for Security in Reliability Systems. European Journal of Operational Research, 181, 773-786. (Pubitemid 46413583)
2. Bandyopadhyay, S., and Sandler, T. 2011. The interplay between preemptive and defensive counterterrorism measures: A two- Stage game. Economica, Vol 78, forthcoming.
3. Barros, C.P, Passos, J., and Gil-Alana, L. A. 2006. The timing of ETA terrorist attacks. Journal of Policy Modeling 28, 3, 335-346. (Pubitemid 43573913)
4. Berman, O. and Gavious, A. 2007. Location of terror response facilities: A game between state and terrorist. European Journal of Operational Research 177, 2, 1113-1133. (Pubitemid 44647639)
5. Berrebi, C. and Lakdawalla, D. (2007) How does terrorism risk vary across space and time? An analysis based on the Israeli experience. Defence and Peace Economics 18, 2, 113-131.
6. Bier, V.M., Oliveros S., Samuelson L. 2007. Choosing what to protect: Strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker. Journal of Public Economic Theory 9, 563-587.
7. Bier, V.M., Abhichandani, V., 2002. Optimal Allocation of Resources for Defense of Simple Series and Parallel Systems from Determined Adversaries. Proceedings of the Engineering Foundation Conference on Risk-Based Decision Making in Water Resources X, Santa Barbara, CA: American Society of Civil Engineers.
8. Bier, V.M., Nagaraj, A., Abhichandani, V., 2005. Protection of Simple Series and Parallel Systems with Components of Different Values. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 87, 315-323.
9. Bier, V.M., Oliveros, S., Samuelson, L., 2007. Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defense Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker. Journal of Public Economic Theory 9 (4), 563-587.
10. Bier, V.M., Haphuriwat, N., Menoyo, J., Zimmerman, R. and Culpen, A. 2008. Optimal Resource Allocation for Defense of Targets Based on Differing Measures of Attractiveness. Risk Analysis 28(3), 763-770. (Pubitemid 351847236)
11. Brown, G., Carlyle, M., Salmeron, J. and Wood, K. 2006. Defending Critical Infrastructure. Interfaces 36, 530-544. (Pubitemid 44905062)
12. Dighe, N., Zhuang J., and Bier V.M., 2009. Secrecy in defensive allocations as a strategy for achieving more cost-effective attacker deterrence, International Journal of Performability Engineering, special issue on System Survivability and Defense against External Impacts, 5(1): 31-43.
13. Elster, J. 1984. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
14. Enders, W. and Sandler, T. 2003. What do we know about the substitution effect in transnational terrorism?. In A. Silke and G. Ilardi (eds) Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, Frank Cass.
15. Enders, W. and Sandler, T. 2005. After 9/11 Is it all different now? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, 2, 259-277. (Pubitemid 40482842)
16. Feichtinger, G. and Novak, A. 2008. Terror and Counterterror Operations: Differential Game with Cyclical Nash Solution. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 139, 3, 541-556.
17. Frey, B.S. 2004. Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot? Edward Elgar.
18. Frey, B.S., Luechinger, S. 2003. How to fight terrorism: Stick or Carrot? Edward Elgar.
19. Frey, B.S., Luechinger, S. 2003. How to fight terrorismAlternatives to deterrence. Defense and Peace Economics 14, 237-249.
20. Hao, M., Jin, S. and Zhuang, J. 2009. Robustness of optimal defensive resource allocations in the face of less than fully rational attackers, Proceedings of the 2009 Industrial Engineering Research Conference, p.p. 886-891.
21. Hausken, K. 2006. Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25, 629-665. (Pubitemid 44783207)
22. Hausken, K. 2008. Whether to Attack a Terrorist's Resource Stock Today or Tomorrow. Games and Economic Behavior 64, 2, 548-564.
23. Hausken, K., Bier, V. and Zhuang, J. 2009. Defending against Terrorism, Natural Disaster, and All Hazards," in Bier, V.M. and Azaiez, M.N. (eds.), Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats, Springer, New York, 65-97.
24. Hirshleifer, J. 1995. Anarchy and Its Breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103, 1, 26-52.
25. Keohane N., Zeckhauser R.J. 2003. The ecology of terror defense. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26, 201-229.
26. Levitin, G., 2007. Optimal Defense Strategy Against Intentional Attacks. IEEE Transactions on Reliability 56(1), 148-156.
27. Levitin, G. and Hausken, K. 2008. Protection vs. Redundancy in Homogeneous Parallel Systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 93, 10, 1444-1451.
28. Michaud, D. Apostolakis, G. 2006, Methodology for ranking the elements of water- Supply networks, Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 12(4), pp.230-242. (Pubitemid 44768337)
29. Patterson, S. Apostolakis, G. 2007, Identification of critical locations across multiple infrastructures for terrorist actions, Reliability Engineering & System Safety 92(9), pp. 1183-1203. (Pubitemid 46341795)
30. Raczynski, S. 2004. Simulation of the dynamic interactions between terror and anti- Terror organizational structures. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 7, 2.
31. Sandler, T. and Siqueira, K. 2009. Games and Terrorism. Simulation & Gaming 40, 2, 164-192.
32. Sandler T., Arce D. G., Enders W. 2008. Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper: Terrorism.
33. Scarf, H. 1960. The optimality of (S,s) policies for the dynamic inventory problem. In Proceedings of the First Stanford Symposium on Mathematical Methods in Social Sciences, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press.
34. Schelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
35. Sima, Qian, ca. 145-ca. 86 B.C. Records of the grand historian of China. Translated from the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Ch'ien by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
36. Skaperdas S. 1996. Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7, 283-290.
37. Stein, R.C. 1991. The World's Greatest Explorers: Hernando Cortés. Chicago Press Inc, Chicago, Illinois.
38. Telesca, L. and Lovallo, M. 2006 Are global terrorist attacks time-correlated? Physica A - Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 362, 2, 480-484.
39. Tullock, G. 1980. Efficient Rent- Seeking, in Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D., and Tullock, G., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, Texas A. & M. University Press, College Station, 97-112.
40. Udwadia, F., Leitmann, G., and Lambertini, L. 2006 A dynamical model of terrorism. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Article ID 85653, doi:10.1155/DDNS/2006/85653.
41. Zhuang, J. and Bier, V.M. 2007. Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters - Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attack Effort. Operations Research 55(5), 976-991. (Pubitemid 351159542)
42. Zhuang, J. and Bier, V.M. 2011. Secrecy and Deception at Equilibrium, with Applications to Anti- Terrorism Resource Allocation, Defence and Peace Economics, 22(1), 43-61, 2011.
43. Zhuang, J., Bier, V.M., and Alagoz, O. 2010. Modeling Secrecy and Deception in a Multiple- Period Attacker- Period AttackerDefender Signaling Game, European Journal of Operational Research, 203(2): 409-418.