Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 548-564

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Attack inefficiency; Conflict; Contest success function; Defense inefficiency; Discounting; Dynamics; Growth; Terror capacity; Terrorism; Threat; Time substitution; Two periods

Indexed keywords

EID: 55349145945     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.001     Document Type: Article

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