Balancing terrorism and natural disasters-defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort

Operations Research

Volumn 55, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 976-991

  Zhuang, Jun ^a   Bier, Vicki M ^a  

^a University of Wisconsin Madison   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision analysis: risk; Games group decisions: noncooperative; Utility preference: applications

Indexed keywords

DEFENSIVE INVESTMENT; NATURAL DISASTERS;

DECISION THEORY; DISASTERS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 38549098290     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1070.0434     Document Type: Article

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