Securing the containerized supply chain: Analysis of government incentives for private investment

Management Science

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 219-233

  Bakshi, Nitin ^a   Gans, Noah ^b  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Container inspections; Game theory; Homeland security; Nuclear weapons; Principal agent models; Queueing theory; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

CONTAINER INSPECTION; CONTAINER INSPECTIONS; HOME LAND SECURITY; PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL; PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS;

CHLORINATION; CONTAINERS; CONTEXT SENSITIVE GRAMMARS; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; INSPECTION; INSPECTION EQUIPMENT; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS; NETWORK SECURITY; NUCLEAR ENERGY; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; QUEUEING THEORY; SECURITY SYSTEMS; SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT; SUPPLY CHAINS; TERRORISM;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77249147433     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1105     Document Type: Article

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