A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 49-65

  Cárceles Poveda, Eva ^a   Tauman, Yair ^a,b  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

Conflict resolution; Proactive and defensive measures; Strategic interactions; Transnational terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650892231     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.010     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. Arce M., Sandler T. Counterterrorism: A game theoretic analysis. J. Conflict Resolution 2005, 49(2):183-200.
2. Arce M., Sandler T. Terrorist signaling and the value of intelligence. Brit. J. Polit. Sci. 2007, 37:576-586.
3. Arce, M. Sandler, T., forthcoming. Terrorist spectaculars: Backlash attacks and the focus of intelligence, J. Conflict Resolution.
4. Atkinson S.E., Sandler T., Tschirhart J. Terrorism in a bargaining framework. J. Law Econ. 1987, 30(1):1-21.
5. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, T., forthcoming. The interplay between preemptive and defensive counterterrorism measures: A two stage game. Economica.
6. Bueno de Mesquita E. The terrorist endgame: A model with moral hazard and learning. J. Conflict Resolution 2005, 49(2):237-258.
7. Bueno de Mesquita E. Conciliation, counterterrorism, and patterns of terrorist violence. Int. Organ. 2005, 59(1):145-176.
8. The Economist Al-Qaeda Operations are Rather Cheap. The Economist 2003, 369:45.
9. Enders W., Sandler T. The effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies: A vector autoregression analysis. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1993, 87(4):829-844.
10. Enders W., Sandler T. Terrorism: Theory and applications. Handbook of Defense Economics 1995, 213-249. K. Hartley, T. Sandler (Eds.).
11. Enders W., Sandler T. What do we know about the substitution effect in transnational terrorism?. Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures 2004, 119-137. Frank Cass, London. A. Silke (Ed.).
12. Enders W., Sandler T. The Political Economy of Terrorism 2006, Cambridge University Press.
13. Enders W., Sandler T. Distribution of Transnational Terrorism among Countries by Income Classes and Geography after 9/11. Int. Stud. Quart 2006.
14. Faria J.R., Arce D. Terror support and recruitment. Defence Peace Econ. 2005, 16(4):263-273.
15. Hausken K. Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow. Games Econ. Behav. 2008, 64:548-564.
16. Jacobson D., Kaplan E. Suicide bombings and targeted killings in (counter) terror games. J. Conflict Resolution 2007, 51:715-743.
17. Lapan H.E., Sandler T. To bargain or not to bargain: That is the question. Amer. Econ. Rev. 1988, 78(2):16-20.
18. Lapan H.E., Sandler T. Terrorism and signalling. Europ. J. Polit. Economy 1993, 9(3):383-398.
19. Lee D.R. Free riding and paid riding in the fight against terrorism. Amer. Econ. Rev. 1988, 78(2):22-26.
20. Lowenberg, A., Mathews, T., 2008. The interdependence between a terrorist's choice of target and homeland security efforts of a state. Unpublished Manuscript. California State University and Kennesaw State University.
21. Melnick, R., Eldor, R., forthcoming. Small investment and large returns: Terrorism, media and the economy. Europ. Econ. Rev.
22. Overgaard The Scale of terrorist attacks as a signal of resources. J. Conflict Resolution 1994, 38(3):452-478.
23. Powell R. Defending against terrorist attacks with limited resources. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev 2007.
24. Rosendorff B.P., Sandler T. Too much of a good thing? The proactive response dilemma. J. Conflict Resolution 2004, 48(5):657-671.
25. Sandler T., Arce D. Terrorism and game theory. Simulation and Gaming 2003, 34(3):319-337.
26. Sandler T., Lapan H.E. The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists' choice of targets. Synthese 1988, 76(2):245-261.
27. Sandler T., Enders W. An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. Europ. J. Polit. Economy 2004, 20(2):301-316.
28. Sandler T., Enders W. Transnational terrorism: An economic analysis. The Economic Impact of Terrorist Attacks 2005, 11-34. H.W. Richardson, P. Gordon, J.E. Moore (Eds.).
29. Sandler T., Siqueira K. Global terrorism: Deterrence versus preemption. Can. J. Econ. 2006, 50(4):1370-1387.
30. Sandler T., Tschirhart J., Cauley J. A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1983, 77(1):36-54.
31. Selten R. A simple game model of kidnappings. Models of Strategic Rationality 1988, 77-93. Kluwer Academic, Boston. R. Selten (Ed.).
32. Trajtenberg M. Defense R&D in the anti-terrorism era. Defence Peace Econ. 2006, 17:177-199.