Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 203, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 409-418

  Zhuang, Jun ^a   Bier, Vicki M ^b   Alagoz, Oguzhan ^b  

^a the State University of New York   (United States)

^b University of Wisconsin Madison   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic programming; Game theory; Multi period game; Secrecy and deception; Signaling game; Truthful disclosure

Indexed keywords

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; INFORMATION UPDATING; MULTI-PERIOD GAME; PRIVATE INFORMATION; SECRECY AND DECEPTION; SIGNALING GAME; SOLUTION APPROACH; TIME PERIODS; TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURE;

DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING; SIGNALING; SYSTEMS ENGINEERING;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 70350704685     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.028     Document Type: Article

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