Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a T-period game

Decision Analysis

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 46-70

  Hausken, Kjell ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

^b State University of New York   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict; Contest success function; Dynamics; Game theory; Multiple period game; Terror capacity; Terrorism; Threat

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952852737     PISSN: 15458490     EISSN: 15458504     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/deca.1100.0194     Document Type: Article

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