Secrecy in defensive allocations as a strategy for achieving more cost-effective attacker deterrence

International Journal of Performability Engineering

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 31-43

  Dighe, Nikhil S ^b,c,d   Zhuang, Jun ^a   Bier, Vicki M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^c M S UNIVERSITY OF BARODA   (India)

^d University of Florida   (United States)

Author keywords

Centralization; Deterrence; Non cooperative games; Secrecy; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 64549092443     PISSN: 09731318     EISSN: 29938341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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