Defending against terrorism, natural disaster, and all hazards

International Series in Operations Research and Management Science

Volumn 128, Issue , 2009, Pages 65-97

  Hausken, Kjell ^a   Bier, Vicki M ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

All hazards protection; Contest success function; Natural disaster; Terrorism; Unit cost of attack; Unit cost of defense

Indexed keywords

EID: 84954516300     PISSN: 08848289     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (20)

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