Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

Volumn 139, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 541-556

  Feichtinger, G ^a   Novak, A J ^b  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Counterterror measures; Differential games; Indeterminacy; Limit cycles

Indexed keywords

TERRORISM;

COUNTERTERROR MEASURE; DIFFERENTIAL GAMES; DYNAMIC GAME THEORIES; INDETERMINACY; LIMIT-CYCLE; LONGEST RUN; NASH SOLUTIONS; OPEN-LOOP; SOLUTION CONCEPTS; STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 55649083124     PISSN: 00223239     EISSN: 15732878     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10957-008-9400-8     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Waldmann, P.: Terrorismus. Murmann Verlag GmbH, Hamburg (2005)
2. S.B. Blomberg G.D. Hess A. Weerapana 2004 An economic model of terrorism Confl. Manag. Peace Sci. 21 17 28
3. Pinker, E.J.: An Analysis of Short-Term Responses to Threats of Terrorism. Simon School of Business, University of Rochester (2005)
4. Castillo-Chavez, C., Song, B.: Models of the transmission dynamics of fanatic behaviors. In: Banks, T., Castillo-Chavez, C. (eds.) Bioterrorism: Mathematical Modeling Applications to Homeland Security. SIAM Series Frontiers in Applied Mathematics, vol. 28, p. 240. SIAM, Philadelphia (2003)
5. A. Fleischer S. Buccola 2002 War, terror, and the tourism market in Israel Appl. Econ. 34 11 1335 1343
6. T. Brück B. Wickström 2004 The economic consequences of terror: guest editors' introduction Eur. J. Political Econ. 20 293 300
7. E.H. Kaplan A. Mintz S. Mishal C. Samban 2005 What happened to suicide bombings in Israel? Insights from a terror stock model Stud. Confl. Terror. 28 225 235
8. E.H. Kaplan D.L. Craft L.M. Wein 2003 Analyzing bioterror response logistics: the case of smallpox Math. Biosci. 185 33 72
9. R.A. Fowler G.D. Sanders D.M. Bravata B. Nouri J.M. Gastwirth D. Peterson A.G. Broker A.M. Garber D.K. Owens 2005 Cost-effectiveness of defending against bioterrorism: a comparison of vaccination and antibiotic prophylaxis against anthrax Ann. Intern. Med. 142 8 601 610
10. Chakrabarti, S., Strauss, A.: Carnival booth: an algorithm for defeating computer-assisted passenger screening systems. First Monday 7(10) (2002)
11. N.O. Keohane R.J. Zeckhauser 2003 The ecology of terror defense J. Risk Uncertain. 26 201 229
12. N.O. Keohane B. Van Roy R.J. Zeckhauser 2007 Managing the quality of a resource with stock and flow controls J. Public Econ. 91 541 569
13. Feichtinger, G.: Environmental policy design and the economics of crime: some analogies in intertemporal optimization. In: Kischka, P., Leopold-Wildburger, U., Möhringer, R.H., Radermacher, F.J. (eds.) Models, Methods and Decision Support for Management. Physica, Heidelburg (2001)
14. Dockner, E., Jorgensen, S., Van Long, N., Sorger, G.: Differential Games in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000)
15. Hassard, B.D., Kazarnioff, N.D., Wan, Y.H.: Theory and Applications of Hopf Bifurcation. Mathematical Lecture Note Series. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1981)
16. T. Sandler J.T. Tschirhart J. Canley 1983 A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism Am. Political Sci. Rev. 77 4 36 54
17. H.E. Lapan T. Sandler 1988 To bargain or not to bargain: that is the question Am. Econ. Rev. 78 2 16 21
18. D.R. Lee 1988 Free riding and paid riding in the fight against terrorism Am. Econ. Rev. 78 2 22 26
19. Behrens, D.A., Caulkins, J.P., Feichtinger, G., Tragler, G.: Incentive Stackelberg strategies for a dynamic game on terrorism. In: Jorgensen, S., Quincampoix, M., Vincent, T.L. (eds.) Advances in Dynamic Game Theory. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol. 9 (2007)
20. Herren, E.: Counter-terrorism dilemmas. Research Report, The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel (2002). http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=432