Games and terrorism: Recent developments

Simulation and Gaming

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 164-192

  Sandler, Todd ^a   Siqueira, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Backlash terrorism; Defensive countermeasures; Game theory; Militant factions; Proactive countermeasures; Suicide attacks; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 63449108250     PISSN: 10468781     EISSN: 1552826X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1046878108314772     Document Type: Conference Paper

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