Secrecy and deception at equilibrium, with applications to anti-terrorism resource allocation

Defence and Peace Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 43-61

  Zhuang, Jun ^a   Bier, Vicki M ^b  

^a the State University of New York   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Homeland security; Resource allocation; Secrecy and deception; Truthful disclosure

Indexed keywords

EID: 79251511489     PISSN: 10242694     EISSN: 14768267     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.491668     Document Type: Article

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