The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 260-285

  Cressman, R ^a   Schlag, K H ^b  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001698231     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2465     Document Type: Article

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