Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 115-141

  Ponti, Giovanni ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Backward induction; Evolutionary Game Theory; Monotonicity; Replicator Dynamics with Drift

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038246078     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0707     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Aumann R. Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality. Games Econ. Behavior. 8:1995;6-19.
2. Battigalli P. On Rationalizability in Extensive Games. J. Econ. Theory. 74:1997;40-61.
3. Ben Porath, E. 1994, Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games, Northwestern University, mimeo.
4. Binmore K. Rationality and Backward Induction. J. Econ. Method. 4:1997;23-41.
5. Binmore, K. and, Samuelson, L. 1997, Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection, University College London, mimeo.
6. Binmore K., Shaked A., Sutton J. An Outside Option Experiment. Quart. J. Econ. 104:1989;753-770.
7. Börgers T., Sarin R. Learning through Reinforcement and the Replicator Dynamics. J. Econ. Theory. 77:1997;1-14.
8. Cabrales, A. 1993, Stochastic Replicator Dynamics, University of California, San Diego, mimeo.
9. Cressman R. Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. J. Econ. Theory. 68:1996;234-248.
10. Cressman, R. and, Schlag, K. H. 1996, The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction, mimeo.
11. Gale J., Binmore K., Samuelson L. Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game. Games Econ. Behavior. 8:1995;56-90.
12. Hofbauer J., Weibull J. Evolutionary Selection Against Dominated Strategies. J. Econ. Theory. 71:1996;558-573.
13. Kandori M., Mailath G., Rob R. Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games. Econometrica. 61:1993;29-56.
14. Kreps D., Milgrom P., Roberts J., Wilson R. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated PD. J. Econ. Theory. 27:1982;245-252.
15. Mc Kelvey R., Palfrey T. R. An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game. Econometrica. 60:1992;803-836.
16. Myerson R. Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept. Int. J. Game Theory. 7:1978;73-80.
17. Nachbar J. H. 'Evolutionary' Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties. Int. J. Game Theory. 19:1990;59-89.
18. Nagel, R. and, Tang, F. F. 1995, An Experimental Study on the Centipede Game in Normal Form: An Investigation on Learning, mimeo.
19. Ponti, G. 1998, Iterated Weak Dominance and Learning Dynamics, University of California Santa Barbara, mimeo.
20. Reny P. Common Beliefs and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information. J. Econ. Theory. 59:1993;257-274.
21. Rosenthal R. Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain Store Paradox. J. Econ. Theory. 25:1981;92-100.
22. Roth A., Erev I. Learning in Extensive Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term. Games Econ. Behavior. 8:1995;164-212.
23. Samuelson L. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. 1997;MIT Press, Cambridge.
24. Samuelson L., Zhang J. Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games. J. Econ. Theory. 57:1992;363-391.
25. Schlag, K. H. 1994, Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution, Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Discussion Paper No. B-296.
26. Selten R. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Theory. 4:1975;25-55.
27. Weibull L. Evolutionary Game Theory. 1995;MIT Press, Cambridge.
28. Young H. P. The Evolution of Conventions. Econometrica. 61:1993;57-84.