Trust and cooperation among economic agents

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 364, Issue 1533, 2009, Pages 3301-3309

  Dasgupta, Partha ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Culture; Exploitation; Negotiation; Rational beliefs; Tipping points

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; CULTURE; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; EXPLOITATION; PRISONER DILEMMA; PUBLIC GOODS; SELECTION;

EID: 72649105670     PISSN: 09628436     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0123     Document Type: Article

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