Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process

Journal of Mathematical Biology

Volumn 52, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 667-681

  Imhof, Lorens A ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Finite populations; Frequency dependent process; Stochastic game dynamics

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHM; ANIMAL; ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; GENETIC SELECTION; HUMAN; MOLECULAR EVOLUTION; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION GENETICS; PROBABILITY;

ALGORITHMS; ANIMALS; EVOLUTION, MOLECULAR; GENETICS, POPULATION; HUMANS; MARKOV CHAINS; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SELECTION (GENETICS);

EID: 33645974834     PISSN: 03036812     EISSN: 14321416     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00285-005-0369-8     Document Type: Article

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