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Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 720-749

Slow to anger and fast to forgive: Cooperation in an uncertain world

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EID: 84859956990     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.720     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (265)

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