Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism

Consciousness and Cognition

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 342-350

  Feltz, Adam ^a   Cokely, Edward T ^b  

^a Schreiner University   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experimental philosophy; Folk intuitions; Free will; Individual differences; Moral responsibility

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; EXTRAVERSION; FREEDOM; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INDIVIDUALITY; INTUITION; LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS; MORALITY; NORMAL HUMAN; PERSONALITY; PHILOSOPHY; PSYCHOLOGY; RESPONSIBILITY; SELF COMPATIBILITY; TASK PERFORMANCE;

FREEDOM; HUMANS; INTUITION; JUDGMENT; PERSONALITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; QUESTIONNAIRES; SELF CONCEPT; SOCIAL PERCEPTION; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY;

EID: 62749179048     PISSN: 10538100     EISSN: 10902376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001     Document Type: Article

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