Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone care about functional zombies?

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 133-155

  Huebner, Bryce ^a,b  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Cyborgs; Folk psychology; Phenomenal consciousness

Indexed keywords

EID: 77349087828     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6     Document Type: Article

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