The folk strike back; Or, why you didn't do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 138, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 291-298

  Phelan, Mark T ^a   Sarkissian, Hagop ^b  

^a University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action theory; Experimental philosophy

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949154112     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-006-9047-y     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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