Can unintended side effects be intentional? Resolving a controversy over intentionality and morality

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Volumn 36, Issue 12, 2010, Pages 1635-1647

  Guglielmo, Steve ^a   Malle, Bertram F ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

bias; blame; intentionality; moral judgment; morality; praise

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; GUILT; HUMAN; MALE; MORALITY; MOTIVATION; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STUDENT; UNIVERSITY;

ADOLESCENT; FEMALE; GOALS; GUILT; HUMANS; INTENTION; JUDGMENT; MALE; MORALS; MOTIVATION; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STUDENTS; UNIVERSITIES; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 78649296428     PISSN: 01461672     EISSN: 15527433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0146167210386733     Document Type: Article

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