Accentuate the Negative

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 297-314

  Alexander, Joshua ^a   Mallon, Ronald ^b   Weinberg, Jonathan M ^c  

^a SIENA COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649980797     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-009-0015-2     Document Type: Article

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