The past and future of experimental philosophy

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 123-149

  Nadelhoffer, Thomas ^a   Nahmias, Eddy ^b  

^a DICKINSON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conceptual analysis; Experimental philosophy; Folk intuitions; Meta philosophy

Indexed keywords

EID: 42549112768     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790701305921     Document Type: Article

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