After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 3-26

  Nichols, Shaun ^a  

^a School of Business   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2442429303     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0951508042000202354     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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