Incentives, targeting, and firm performance: An analysis of non-executive stock options

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 11, 2010, Pages 4148-4186

  Hochberg, Yael V ^a   Lindsey, Laura ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958561778     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq093     Document Type: Article

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