Evolutionary stability and social norms

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 113-140

  Sethi, Rajiv ^a  

^a Barnard College of Columbia University   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionarily stable state; Optimizing behavior; Replicator dynamics; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029690002     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00053-4     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Akerlof, G., 1983, Loyalty filters, American Economic Review 73, 54-63.
2. Axelrod, R., 1984, The evolution of cooperation (Basic Books, New York).
3. Axelrod, R., 1986, An evolutionary approach to norms, American Political Science Review 80, 1095-1111.
4. Banerjee, A. and Weibull, J., 1994, Evolutionary selection and rational behavior, in: A. Kirman and M. Salmon, eds., Rationality and learning in economics, Blackwell, Oxford.
5. Björnerstedt, J. and Weibull, J., 1994, Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation, Discussion paper, Department of Economics, Stockholm University.
6. Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J., 1990, Group selection among alternative evolutionarily stable strategies. Journal of Theoretical Biology 145, 331-342.
7. Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J., 1992, Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (and anything else) in sizable groups, Ethology and Sociobiology 13, 171-195.
8. Binmore, K.G. and Samuelson, L., 1994, An economist's perspective on the evolution of norms, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150, 45-63.
9. Elster, J., 1990, When rationality fails, in: Karen S. Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The limits of rationality, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
10. Frank, R., 1988, Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions, W.W. Norton, New York.
11. Friedman, M., 1953, The methodology of positive economics, in: Essays in positive economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
12. Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E., 1986, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information, Econometrica 54, 533-554.
13. Gale, J., Binmore, K.G. and Samuelson, L., 1995, Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 56-90.
14. Güth, W. and Kliemt, H., 1993, Competition or cooperation: On the evolutionary economics of trust, exploitation and moral attitudes, Metroeconomica 45, 155-187.
15. Güth, W. and Yaari, M., 1992, An evolutionary approach to explaining reciprocal behavior in a simple strategic game, in: U. Witt, ed., Explaining process and change-approaches to evolutionary economics, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
16. Kuran, T., 1987, Preference falsification, policy continuity and collective conservatism, Economic Journal 97, 642-665.
17. Kuran, T., 1991, Cognitive limitations and preference evolution, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 147, 241-273.
18. Heal, G., 1976, Do Good Products Drive Out Bad, Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 499-502.
19. Hirshleifer, J., 1987, On Emotions as guarantors of threats and promises, in: P. Dupre, ed., The latest on the best, MIT Press, Cambridge.
20. Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K., 1988, The theory of evolution and dynamical systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
21. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L. and Thaler, R.H., 1986, Fairness and the assumptions of economics, Journal of Business 59, 285-300.
22. Maynard Smith, J., 1982, Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
23. Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G.R., 1973, The logic of animal conflicts, Nature 246, 15-18.
24. Robson, A., 1990, Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash and the secret handshake. Journal of Theoretical Biology 144, 379-396.
25. Samuelson, L. and Zhang, J., 1992, Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games, Journal of Economic Theory 57, 363-91.
26. Schelling, T.C., 1960, The strategy of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
27. Schelling, T.C., 1978, Altruism, meanness and other potentially strategic behaviors, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 68, 229-30.
28. Sethi, R. and E. Somanathan, 1995, The evolution of social norms in common property resource use, Working paper #96-01, Department of Economics, Barnard College.
29. Taylor, P. and Jonker, L., 1978, Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics, Mathematical Biosciences 40, 145-156.
30. Thaler, R.H., 1988, Anomalies: The ultimatum game, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 195-206.
31. Van Damme, E., 1987, Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria, second edition, Springer Verlag, Berlin.
32. Witt, U., 1986, Evolution and stability of cooperation without enforceable contracts, Kyklos 39, 245-266.
33. Zeeman, E.C., 1979, Population dynamics from game theory, in: Z. Nitecki and C. Robinson, eds., Global theory of dynamical systems, Springer Verlag, Berlin.