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Volumn 76, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 445-470

Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Employee stock options; Executive compensation; Option exercises

Indexed keywords


EID: 16844364706     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.006     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (138)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.