Information aggregation in polls

American Economic Review

Volumn 98, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 864-896

  Morgan, John ^a   Stocken, Phillip C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68249117535     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.864     Document Type: Article

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