Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 1029-1058

  Feddersen, Timothy ^a   Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Elections; Information aggregation; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000584976     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171878     Document Type: Article

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