Asymmetric information and legislative rules: Some amendments

American Political Science Review

Volumn 95, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 435-452

  Krishna, Vijay ^a   Morgan, John ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035533821     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055401002192     Document Type: Review

References (20)

1. Austen-Smith, David. 1990. "Information Transmission in Debate." American Journal of Political Science 34 (1): 124-52.
2. Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice; Multiple Referrals under Open Rule." Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1): 3-43.
3. Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. "Monopoly Agenda Control with Asymmetric Information." Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (2): 445-64.
4. Banks, Jeffrey S. 1991. Signalling Games in Political Science. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic.
5. Baron, David P. 1999. "Legislative Organization with Informational Committees." Research Paper No. 1572, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
6. Battaglini, Marco. 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk." Working Paper, Department of Economics, Princeton University.
7. Crawford, Vincent P., and Joel Sobel. 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission." Econometrica 50 (6): 1431-51.
8. Dewatripont, Matthias, and Jean Tirole. 1999. "Advocates." Journal of Political Economy 107 (1): 1-39.
9. Dion, Douglas D., and John D. Huber. 1996. "Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules." Journal of Politics 58 (1): 25-53.
10. Dion, Douglas D., and John D. Huber. 1997. "Sense and Sensibility: The Role of Rules." American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 945-57.
11. Epstein, David. 1998. "Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 14 (2): 183-204.
12. Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (2): 287-335.
13. Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee." American Journal of Political Science 33 (2): 459-90.
14. Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
15. Krehbiel, Keith. 1997a. "Restrictive Rules Reconsidered." American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 919-44.
16. Krehbiel, Keith. 1997b. "Rejoinder to 'Sense and Sensibility.'" American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 958-64.
17. Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1979. "Bureaucrats vs. Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy." Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (4): 563-88.
18. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." American Political Science Review 81 (1): 85-104.
19. Sinclair, Barbara. 1994. "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy." Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (4): 477-94.
20. Weingast, Barry R., and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." Journal of Political Economy 96 (1): 132-63.