Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting

American Political Science Review

Volumn 92, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 23-35

  Feddersen, Timothy ^a   Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032220634     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2585926     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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