Information aggregation in debate: Who should speak first?

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 393-421

  Ottaviani, Marco ^a   Sørensen, Peter ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Committee; D71; D82; D83; Expertise; Order; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037609383     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00119-5     Document Type: Article

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