Committee design with endogenous information

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 165-191

  Persico, Nicola ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DESIGN; INFORMATION; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0842269255     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00280     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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